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THE OCTOBER  1979 REGIME  OF 
MONETARY  CONTROL  AND  THE BEHAVIOR 
OF THE MONEY  SUPPLY  IN 1980* 
Robert  L.  Hetzel 
I.  Introduction 
In  October  1979,  the  Federal  Reserve  System 
instituted  a  regime  of  monetary  control  characterized 
by  lagged-reserve  accounting  and  a  nonborrowed- 
reserves  operating  target.  Section  II  of  this  article 
provides  an  analytical  framework  for  this  regime. 
Section  III  appraises  the  efficacy,  for  purposes  of 
monetary  control,  of  this  regime  by  comparing  it  to  a 
regime  characterized  by  contemporaneous-reserve 
accounting  and  a  total-reserves  operating  target. 
Section  IV  describes  the  actual  implementation  of  the 
regime.  Section  V  examines  the  question  of  why  the 
rate  of  growth  of  the  money  supply  was  so  variable 
within  1980. 
Il.  An  Analytical  Framework 
This  analysis  concentrates  on  the  determination  of 
the  level  of  nominal  bank  deposits.  The  microeco- 
nomic  analysis  begins  with  the  markets  for  bank 
reserves  and  for  bank  credit.  Banks  are  middlemen 
and  these  two  markets,  respectively,  summarize  for 
them  the  cost  of  borrowing  and  the  return  to  lending. 
More  specifically,  in  a  competitive  banking  system 
with  a  systemwide  market  for  bank  reserves,  the 
price  of  reserves  in  the  reserves  market  constrains 
the  asset  acquisition  (credit  extension)  of  individual 
banks.  A  bank  purchases  an  asset  by  crediting,  either 
directly  or  via  a  correspondent  bank,  the  deposit 
account  of  the  seller  of  the  asset.  The  cost  of  pur- 
chasing  an  asset  is  then  the  cost  of  replacing  the 
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reserves  lost  when  the  seller  of  the  asset  draws  down 
his  account.  When  the  interest  rates  in  the  reserves 
and  credit  markets  differ,  banks  respond  by  adjusting 
their  holdings  of  interest-bearing  assets.  The  process 
of  arbitraging  the  interest  rates  in  these  two  markets 
determines  the  nominal  quantity  of  interest-bearing 
assets  (credit  extension)  of  the  banking  system  and, 
as  a  consequence,  its  deposits. 
Banks  possess  many  ways  of  acquiring  reserves. 
For  example,  they  can  use  the  Eurodollar,  certificate 
of  deposit,  repurchase  agreement,  or  Federal  funds 
market.  Banks  arbitrage  the  rates  across  these  mar- 
kets  so  that  the  price  of  obtaining  reserves  from  each 
s6urce  is  equal,  apart  from  considerations  of  term 
structure,  risk,  and  transactions  costs.  It  is,  there- 
fore,  convenient  to  represent  the  price  of  reserves 
by  a  single  price,  the  funds  rate.  The  Federal  Re- 
serve  influences  the  cost  of  asset  acquisition  to  banks 
through  its  influence  on  the  Federal  funds  rate.  By 
altering  the  funds  rate,  the  Federal  Reserve  can  move 
the  banking  system  along  the  demand  for  credit 
schedule  it  faces,  thereby  determining  the  nominal 
quantity  of  bank  credit  outstanding  and,  consequently, 
the  nominal  quantity  of  total  bank  deposits. 
The  way  in  which  the  Federal  Reserve  influences 
the  funds  rate  is  summarized  by  the  shape  of  the 
reserve-supply  schedule  in  the  market  for  bank  re- 
serves.  With  a  nonborrowed-reserves  operating  tar- 
get,  this  schedule  possesses  a  vertical  section,  at  the 
existing  value  of  nonborrowed  reserves,  for  values  of 
the  funds  rate  less  than  the  discount  rate  (Figure 
la).  As  banks  collectively  increase  their  use  of  the 
discount  window,  that  is,  as  total  reserves  increase 
above  the  level  of  nonborrowed  reserves,  the  Federal 
Reserve  raises  the  nonpecuniary  cost  of  borrowing. 
The  marginal  effective  cost  of  obtaining  reserves  from 
the  window  rises  above  the  discount  rate  and,  through 
arbitrage,  the  funds  rate  also  rises  above  the  discount 
rate.  The  positive  relationship  between  borrowed 
reserves  and  the  differential  between  the  funds  rate 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  3 Figure  la  Figure  lb 
RESERVES  MARKET  BANK  CREDIT  MARKET 
FUNDS  RATE 
I  RD 
NBR,  Reserves 
FR  is  the  funds  rate;  DR  the  discount  rote;  BR  borrowing  from  the  discount  window;  NBR  nonborrowed  reserves.  RS  is  the  reserve- 
supply  schedule  of  the  Federal  Reserve.  RD  is  the  reserve-demand  schedule  of  the  banking  system.  LR  is  the  nominal  interest  rate  on  bank 
credit.  BC  is  fhe  stock  of  nominal  bank  credit.  BCS  and  BCD  ore  the  bank-credit  supply  schedule  and  bank-credit  demand  schedule, 
respectively.  The  O’s  denote  particular  values. 
and  the  discount  rate  is  shown  in  Figure  la  by  the 
positively  sloping  section  of  the  reserve-supply 
schedule. 
Because  of  lagged-reserve  accounting,  the  reserve- 
demand  schedule  is  vertical.  Required  reserves  are 
predetermined  because  they  depend  upon  deposits 
held  two  weeks  in  the  past,  rather  than  upon  deposits 
held  in  the  current  statement  week.  Also,  desired 
excess  reserves  appear  to  be  practically  interest- 
insensitive  in  the  October  1979  regime,  at  least  at 
current  levels  of  interest  rates.  For  example,  a  re- 
gression  of  excess  reserves  on  the  funds  rate  and  a 
lagged  value  of  excess  reserves  from  October  1979 
through  1980  reveals  the  absence  of  a  statistically 
significant  relationship  between  excess  reserves  and 
the  funds  rate. 
The  demand  schedule  in  the  market  for  the  stock  of 
bank  credit  is  downward  sloping.  The  supply  sched- 
ule  is  horizontal  (Figure  lb).  This  characteristic 
derives  from  lagged-reserve  accounting  for  the  fol- 
lowing  reason.  Changes  in  bank  credit  produce 
changes  in  deposits,  but,  because  of  lagged-reserve 
accounting,  the  associated  changes  in  required  re- 
serves,  and  thus  in  the  demand  for  reserves  by  the 
banking.system,  occur  with  a  lag  of  two  weeks.  The 
banking  system  in  the  first  instance  accommodates 
changes  in  the  demand  for  credit  at  the  existing  rate 
on  bank  loans  because,  initially,  such  accommodation 
does  not  affect  its  cost  of  funds,  the  funds  rate.  The 
supply  schedule  is  drawn  at  the  height  of  the  funds 
rate  plus  a .markup.  This  markup,  which  is  quite 
variable,  reflects  the  transactions  costs  of  intermedi- 
ation.  It  reflects  term  structure  considerations  in 
that  the  loan  rate  is  for  longer  maturities  than  the 
funds  rate.  Finally,  it  reflects  the  fact  that  while  the 
funds  rate  moves  rapidly  in  line  with  other  money- 
market  rates,  the  loan  rate  (in  particular,  the  prime 
rate)  moves  sIuggishly.x 
The  analytical  apparatus  summarized  in  Figure  1 
can  be  illustrated  by  considering  the  effect  of  a  reduc- 
tion  in  nonborrowed  reserves.  Because  the  quantity 
of  reserves  demanded  is  fixed  in  a  given  reserve- 
accounting  period,  borrowing  from  the  discount  win- 
dow  rises  by  an  amount  equal  in  magnitude  to  the 
reduction  in  nonborrowed  reserves.  As  a  result,  the 
marginal  effective  rate  of  interest  on  borrowed  re- 
serves  rises.  (In  Figure  3a,  RS  shifts  leftward  to 
RS’  and  intersects  the  unchanged  RD  schedule  at  a 
higher  funds  rate.  The  remainder  of  Figure  3  is  in- 
applicable  to  this  example.)  The  cost  of  asset  acqui- 
sition  to  banks  rises.  The  bank-credit  supply  schedule 
shifts  upward  and  intersects  the  bank-credit  demand 
1 A  fundamental  issue  is  whether  a  theory  of  the  money 
supply  process  should  be  organized  primarily  around  the 
market  for  the  quantity  of  money  (New  View)  or  pri- 
marily  around  the  market  for  bank  credit  (Old  View). 
The  Appendix  indicates  how  the  market  for  the  quantity 
of  money  can  be  incorporated  into  the  model  in  the  paper 
along  either  New  or  Old  View  lines.  The  discussion  is 
reserved  for  an  appendix  because  the  method  of  incor- 
poration  of  this  market  does  not  alter  the  analysis  in  the 
paper.  (The  discussion  is  simplified  by  the  assumption 
that  all  bank  deposits  are  checkable  deposits.) 
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An  increase  in  the  discount  rate  also  lowers  bank 
deposits.  The  increase  produces  the  same  increase  in 
the  height  of  the  reserve  supply  schedule  and,  conse- 
quently,  the  same  increase  in  the  funds  rate.  (In 
Figure  3a,  RS’  shifts  upward  to  RS”  and  intersects 
the  unchanged  RD  schedule  at  a  higher  funds  rate. 
The  remainder  of  Figure  3  is  inapplicable  to  this 
example.)  An  increase  in  the  discount  rate  does  not 
reduce  the  differential  between  the  funds  rate  and  the 
discount  rate  until  after  the  passage  of  two  weeks 
when  the  reserve  demand  schedule  shifts  leftward. 
(This  implication  of  the  model  is  supported  by  the 
data  presented  .in  [4,  pp.  25-271.)’ 
In  principle,  in  the  October  1979  regime,  the  non- 
borrowed-reserves  target  would  be  derived  as  follows 
from  the  target  for  checkable  deposits  that  is  implied 
by  the  money  supply  target.  Given  the  public’s  de- 
mand  for  the  nonmonetary  deposits  of  banks,  the 
targeted  value  of  checkable  deposits  will  imply  a 
particular  level  of  bank  credit,  say,  BCo  (see  Figure 
1).  Given  the  position  of  the  bank-credit  demand 
schedule,  this  level  of  bank  credit  is  associated  with 
the  rate  on  bank  loans,  LR,.  This  rate  will  imply  a 
funds  rate,  FRO,  given  an  estimate  of  the  markup  of 
2 With  a  two-week  lag,  this  reduction  in  bank  deposits 
causes  a  reduction  in  required  reserves  and  the  reserve- 
demand  schedule,  RD,  shifts  leftward.  The  funds  rate 
falls.  This  fall  causes  the  banking  system  to  increase  its 
interest-bearing  assets  and,  as  a  byproduct,  its  deposits. 
The  original  decrease  in  nonborrowed  reserves  produces 
a  lower  level  of  deposits,  but  the  approach  to  the  lower 
level  is,  as  just  suggested,  an  oscillatory  one. 
a  Bank  checkable  deposits,  the  quantity  relevant  for 
determination  of  the  money  supply,  equal  total  hank 
deposits  minus  the  nonmonetary  deposits  of  banks.  The 
rate  banks  pay  on  their  nonmonetary  deposits  equals  the 
funds  rate  adjusted  for  the  term-structure  of  interest 
rates  (abstracting  from  Reg.  Q).  The  public  compares 
the  rate  on  bank  nonmonetary  deposits  with  money- 
market  rates  and  decides  how  much  of  its  liquid  assets 
to  allocate  to  the  nonmonetary  deposits  of  banks.  The 
nominal  quantity  of  bank  checkable  deposits  is  then 
determined  as  a  residual,  that  is,  by  subtracting  the  non- 
monetary  deposits  desired  by  the  public  from  total  bank 
deposits.  The  variability  in  the  demand  for  the  nonmone- 
tary  liabilities  of  banks  causes  considerable  divergence  in 
the  behavior  of  bank  credit  and  the  monev  stock.  As 
described  in  Section  IV,  the  Federal  Reser;e  offsets  the 
effect  of  this  variability  on  the  money  supply  by  accom- 
modating  reserve  demand  due  to  banks’  nonmonetary 
deposits. 
4 The  monetary  consequences  of  the  behavior  of  the 
discount  rate  depend  upon  the  particular  regime  of 
monetary  control.  When  the  funds  rate  serves  as  the 
operating  target,  as  in  the  pre-October  1979  regime,  the 
behavior  of  the  discount  rate  is  largely  irrelevant.  Given 
the  funds-rate  target,  changes  in  the  discount  rate  change 
the  average,  but  not  the  marginal,  cost  of  asset  acqui- 
sition  to  banks  and  do  not,  therefore,  affect  the  money 
supply  (see  [6,  p.  291). 
the  loan  rate  over  the  rate  banks  pay  on  their  lia- 
bilities.  By  producing  a  price  of  reserves  equal  to 
FRo,  the  Federal  Reserve  will  cause  banks  to  alter 
their  holdings  of  interest-bearing  assets  until  the 
interest  rate  in  the  bank  credit  market  is  LRo,  bank 
credit  is  BCo,  and  the  deposit  target  is  achieved. 
The  Federal  Reserve  must  choose  its  nonborrowed- 
reserves  target  so’as  to  shift  the  reserve  supply  sched- 
ule,  RS,  into  a  position  such  that  its  interaction  with 
the  reserve  demand  schedule,  RD,  will  produce  the 
desired  funds  rate,  FRO.  For  the  first  two  weeks  of  a 
targeting  interval,  the  position  of  the  reserve  demand 
schedule  is  given  by  the  predetermined  value  of  re- 
quired  reserves  plus  an  estimate  of  desired  excess 
reserves.  Thereafter,  assuming  for  analytical  con- 
venience  prompt  movement  of  the  money  supply  to 
its  targeted  value,  the  position  of  the  reserve  demand 
schedule  is  derived  by  estimating  the  amount  of  re- 
quired  and  excess  reserves  associated  with  the  tar- 
geted  value  of  the  money  supply. 
This  procedure  could  in  principle  allow  the  Federal 
Reserve  to  set  a  money-supply  target  for  a  future 
interval  and  then  specify  the  values  for  nonborrowed 
reserves  necessary  to  achieve  this  target  (feedforward 
control  of  the  money  supply).  It  would  require,  how- 
ever,  an  ability  to  predict  shifts  in  the  bank-credit 
demand  schedule  and  an  ability  to  understand  the 
dynamics  of  the  interaction  between  the  reserves  and 
bank-credit  market.  Perhaps  because  of  the  difficulty 
of  fulfilling  such  requirements,  the  Federal  Reserve 
has  adopted  a  different,  conceptually  less-complicated 
targeting  procedure  (more  properly  characterized 
as  a  feedback  control  procedure).  The  actual  pro- 
cedure  is  described  in  Section  IV. 
Hi.  Efficacy  of  the  October  1979  Regime 
The  efficacy,  for  purposes  of  monetary  control,  of 
the  October  1979  regime  depends  upon  the  predicta- 
bility  of  the  key  behavioral  relationships  of  this  re- 
gime.  It  is  instructive  to  contrast  the  October  1979 
regime  with  a  regime  of  contemporaneous-reserve 
accounting  and  a  total-reserves  operating  target.  By 
definition,  bank  deposits  (D)  equal  the  product  of  the 
reciprocal  of  the  total  reserves  (TR)  to  deposits  ratio 
of  the  banking  system  and  total  reserves. 
(1)  D =  (&,)  7X. 
In  the  latter  regime,  determination  of  the  nominal 
quantity  of  bank  deposits  can  be  summarized  by 
replacing,  in  the  above  definitional  relationship,  the 
actual  total  reserves-deposits  ratio  with  the  total 
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The  reason  that  the  definitional  relationship  can  be 
replaced  by  a  behavioral  relationship  is  that,  given 
total  reserves,  the  funds  rate  varies  in  order  to  bring 
the  actual  total  reserves-deposits  ratio  into  line  with 
the  banking  system’s  desired  total  reserves-deposits 
ratio.  For  example,  consider  an  increase  in  total 
reserves  that  leaves  the  actual  in  excess  of  the  desired 
total  reserves-deposits  ratio.  Banks  collectively  will 
try  to  sell  Federal  funds  causing  the  funds  rate  to  fall, 
The  fall  in  the  cost  of  asset  acquisition  spurs  banks  to 
acquire  interest-bearing  assets.  These  acquisitions 
increase  bank  deposits  and  the  actual  total  reserves- 
deposits  ratio  falls.  The  process  ends  when  the  actual 
is  reduced  to  the  desired  total  reserves-deposits  ratio. 
In  sum,  in  a  regime  characterized  by  contem- 
poraneous-reserve  accounting  and  a  total  reserves 
operating  target,  a  reserves-deposits,  or  a  reserves- 
money,  multiplier  relationship  is  a  useful  analytical 
device  for  understanding  the  money-supply  process. 
In  contrast,  in  a  regime  of  lagged-reserve  account- 
ing  and  a  nonborrowed-reserves  operating  target,  a 
reserves-money  multiplier  relationship  is  not  an  ana- 
lytically  (or  operationally)  significant  concept.  Note 
first  that  the  total  reserves-deposits  ratio  does  not 
exist  as  a behavioral  relationship.  One  way  of  making 
this  point  is  to  note  the  lack  of  a  relationship  between 
total  reserves  and  deposits  over  a  particular  reserve 
accounting  period.  Recall  the  description  in  Section 
II  of  how  a reduction  in  nonborrowed  reserves  lowers 
deposits.  For  the  reserve-accounting  period  in  which 
the  reduction  in  nonborrowed  reserves  occurs,  de- 
posits  fall  without  any  change  in  required  reserves 
and,  consequently,  without  any  significant  change  in 
total  reserves.  Despite  the  exogenously  given  value  of 
total  reserves,  deposits  change. 
The  practical  impossibility  of  targeting  total  re- 
serves  directly  in  this  regime  reflects  the  lack  of  a 
behavioral  relationship  between  total  reserves  and 
deposits.  The  reserve-demand  schedule  is, approxi- 
mately  completely  interest  inelastic  because  of  lagged- 
reserve  accounting.  The  reserve-supply  schedule  is 
by  definition  completely  interest  inelastic  with  a total- 
reserves  operating  target.  An  attempt  to  target  total 
reserves,  therefore,  would  produce,  in  a  particular 
reserve-accounting  period,  a  razor’s  edge  situation  in 
which  a  reserve  surplus  would  force  the  funds  rate 
down  toward  zero  and  a  reserve  deficiency  would 
force  the  funds  rate  up  to  a  point  where  banks  would 
be  willing  to  default  on  their  deficiency.  The  funds 
rate  cannot  equilibrate  the  market  for  reserves  if 
neither  the  reserve-demand  nor  the  reserve-supply 
schedule  possesses  some  interest  elasticity.  (A 
penalty  discount  rate,  because  it  would  render  the 
supply  of  total  reserves  interest  inelastic,  is,  likewise, 
not  feasible  in  the  October  1979  regime.) 
It  is,  as  a  formal  matter,  possible  to  write  down  a 
“money-multiplier”  relationship  for  a  regime  of 
lagged-reserve  accounting  and  a  nonborrowed- 
reserves  operating  target,  that  is,  a  formula  equating 
money  (or  deposits)  to  the  product  of  a  “multiplier” 
and  nonborrowed  reserves.  One  of  the  ratios  in 
this  “multiplier,”  however,  is  the  ratio  of  deposits 
in  the  statement  week  two  weeks  in  the  past  to  de- 
posits  in  the  current  statement  week.  (This  “money- 
multiplier”  formula  is  written  out  in  [2,  p.  531,  al- 
though  the  net  source  base,  high-powered  money 
minus  borrowed  reserves,  is  used  in  place  of  nonbor- 
rowed  reserves.)  The  ratio  of  lagged  deposits  to 
current  deposits  is  not  a  behavioral  relationship: 
therefore,  this  “multiplier”  is  not  a  useful  summary 
of  the  behavioral  relationships  that  determine  bank 
deposits  and  the  money  supply.  There  is  a  functional 
relationship  for  the  October  1979  regime  relating 
deposits  to  .nonborrowed  reserves,  but  it  depends 
upon  the  key  behavioral  relationships  of  the  regime- 
the  upward  sloping  section  of  the  reserve-supply 
schedule,  the  markup  of  the  loan  rate  over  the  funds 
rate,  and  the  bank-credit  demand  schedule.  The 
influence  of  these  behavioral  relationships  is  not  use- 
fully  summarized  within  a  money-multiplier  frame- 
work. 
The  central  idea  of  this  section  is  that  the  efficacy 
of  the  October  1979  regime  of  monetary  control, 
relative  to  a  regime  of  contemporaneous-reserve  ac- 
counting  and  a  total-reserves  operating  target,  de- 
pends  upon  the  relative  predictability  of  the  key 
behavioral  relationships  of  these  regimes.  The  key 
behavioral  relationships  of  the  former  regime  are  the 
reserve-supply  schedule,  the  markup  of  the  loan  rate 
over  the  funds  rate,  and  the  bank-credit  demand 
schedule.  The  key  relationship  in  the  latter  is  the 
total  reserves-depdsits  ratio. 
Evidence  from  the  1970s  indicates  that  the  bank- 
credit  demand  schedule  is  not  predictable.  In  the 
197Os,  the  Federal  Reserve  used  the  funds  rate  as  its 
operating  target.  In  a  regime  of  funds  rate  targeting, 
the  reserve-supply  schedule  and  the  bank-credit 
supply  schedule  are  infinitely  elastic  (at  values,  re- 
spectively,  equal  to  the  funds  rate  and  somewhat 
above  the  funds  rate  adjusted  for  the  term  structure 
of  interest  rates).  Consequently,  shifts  in  the  bank- 
credit  demand  schedule  determine  simultaneously 
bank  interest-bearing  assets,  deposits,  and  reserves. 
(Reserves  appear  with  a  two-week  lag.  Because  of 
lagged-reserve  accounting,  deposits  determine  the 
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future.  The  Federal  Reserve  automatically  supplies 
this  quantity  as  a  consequence  of  targeting  the  funds 
rate.)  In  the  197Os,  the  Federal  Reserve  invested 
considerable  amounts  of  staff  effort  in  an  attempt  to 
predict  the  behavior  of  bank  deposits  and  the  money 
supply  for  its  targeted  funds  rate.  This  effort  was 
largely  unsuccessful,  apart  from  predicting  seasonal 
movements  left  in  the  money  supply  by  imperfect 
seasonal  adjustment  procedures.  (This  unsatisfactory 
situation  was  referred  to  in  statements  by  the  Federal 
Reserve  that  explained  the  change  in  monetary  re- 
gime  in  October  1979.  See  [ 10,  p.  1391.)  The  diffi- 
culty  of  predicting  the  behavior  of  deposits  and  the 
money  supply  in  a  regime  with  a funds  rate  operating 
target  is  evidence  that  the  bank-credit  demand  sched- 
ule  is  not  predictable. 
The  markup  of  the  loan  rate  over  the  funds  rate  is 
extremely  variable.  Even  if  it  and  the  bank-credit 
demand  schedule  are  unpredictable,  however,  pre- 
dictability  of  the  upward-sloping  section  of  the 
reserve-supply  schedule  would  make  possible  simple 
feedback  control  of  the  money  supply.  Whenever  the 
money  supply  deviated  from  target,  as  a  consequence 
of  a fixed  target  for  nonborrowed  reserves,  borrowed 
reserves  and  the  funds  rate  would  vary  in  a  way  that 
would  offset  the  deviation.  The  target  for  nonbor- 
rowed  reserves  could  also  be  changed.  A  review  of 
experience  under  the  new  operating  procedures  by 
economists  at  the  New  York  Trading  Desk,  however, 
indicates  that  the  reserve  supply  schedule  is  not  pre- 
dictable.  “The  federal  funds  rate  .  .  . can  vary  widely 
for  a given  level  of  borrowing.  Changes  in  the  federal 
funds  rate  appear  to  be  strongly  influenced  not  only 
by  the  borrowing  level  itself  but  also  by  past  bor- 
rowing  experience  and  by  market  expectations  of 
future  rate  developments”  [S,  pp.  28-291.  Of  par- 
ticular  interest  is  the  discussion  of  the  “distinctive 
episodes  in  which  the  spread  [between  the  funds  rate 
and  the  discount  rate]  departed  dramatically  from  the 
basic  relationship”  [S,  pp.  29ff.l. 
How  predictable  would  the  total  reserves-deposits 
ratio  be  in  a  regime  of  contemporaneous-reserve 
accounting  and  a  total-reserves  operating  target  ? 
Unfortunately,  this  question  cannot  be  resolved  em- 
pirically  on  the  basis  of  the  past  relationship  between 
total  reserves  and  deposits.  In  the  pre-October  1979 
regime,  the  Federal  Reserve  used  the  funds  rate  as  its 
operating  target  (see  [S]  ).  As  discussed  above, 
with  a  funds-rate  operating  target,  deposits  and  total 
reserves  become  simultaneously  determined  endoge- 
nous  variables  with  bank  credit  the  exogenous  vari- 
able.  If  total  reserves  were  to  become  an  exogenously 
determined  variable,  the  relationship  between  it  and 
deposits  would  be  expected  to  become  less  predict- 
able.  (This  point  is  made  in  [7,  p.  9321). 
On  the  other  hand,  the  potential  does  exist  that  the 
total  reserves-deposits  ratio  would  be  a  predictable 
relationship  in  a  regime  of  the  above  type.  In  such  a 
regime,  assuming  uniform  reserve  requirements  ap- 
plied  only  to  monetary  liabilities,  unpredictability  of 
the  total  reserves-deposits  ratio  would  arise  primarily 
from  the  behavior  of  excess  reserves.  Shifts  in  the 
bank-credit  demand  schedule  could  cause  unpredict- 
able  changes  in  deposits  via  the  effect  on  excess  re- 
serves.  If,  however,  excess  reserves  are  largely 
interest  inelastic,  the  effect  of  these  shifts  would  be 
neutralized.  More  generally,  the  financial  incentive 
that  banks  have  to  manage  their  holdings  of  excess 
reserves  creates  the  potential  that  the  excess  reserves- 
deposits,  and  thus  the  total  reserves-deposits,  ratio 
would  be  predictable. 
It  is  the  demonstrated  unpredictability  of  the  basic 
behavioral  relationships  that  shape  the  process  of 
deposit  determination  in  the  October  1979  regime 
that  renders  appealing  an  experiment  with  a  different 
regime  of  monetary  control.  In  the  October  1979 
regime,  in  order  to  control  the  money  supply  with 
other  than  the  crudest  kind  of  feedback-control  pro- 
cedure,  the  Federal  Reserve  must  determine  the 
funds  rate  implied  by  its  money-supply  target-an 
impossible  task  because  of  the  unpredictability  of  the 
bank-credit  demand  schedule.  Furthermore,  the 
funds  rate  must  be  set  indirectly  by  operating  through 
another  unpredictable  relationship,  the  reserve  supply 
schedule.  Because  the  central  behavioral  relation- 
ship  of  a regime  of  contemporaneous-reserve  account- 
ing  and  a  total-reserves  operating  target  is  a  poten- 
tially  stable  one,  this  regime  offers  the  prospect  of 
improved  monetary  control. 
IV.  Implementation  of  the  October  1979 
Operating  Procedures 
At  its  meetings,  the  Federal  Open  Market  Com- 
mittee  (FOMC)  specifies  an  intrayearly  target  for 
the  rate  of  growth  of  the  money  supply.  From  this 
target,  the  board  staff  derives  a  target  for  the  average 
level  of  total  reserves  for  either  one  or  two  targeting 
intervals  between  the  current  and  succeeding  FOMC 
meeting.  This  target  is  an  intermediate  target  in  that 
it  is  not  directly  under  the  control  of  the  System 
Open  Market  Account  Manager  (the  desk).  The 
FOMC  also  specifies  an  initial  target  for  borrowed 
reserves,  again  as  an  average  to  be  achieved  over  the 
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total-reserves  and  borrowed-reserves  targets  deter- 
mines  the  intermeeting  target  for  average  nonbor- 
rowed  reserves.  This  target  is  an  operating  target, 
and  it  is  translated  into  a  weekly  path. 
It  is  useful  to  recall  the  reserve  identity 
(2)  NBR  -  RR  =  ER  -  BR, 
where  NBR  is  nonborrowed  reserves,  RR  is  required 
reserves,  ER  is  excess  reserves,  and  BR  is  borrowed 
reserves.  (By  transposing  the  negative  terms,  this 
relation  is  shown  to  be  the  identity  “total  reserves 
equal  total  reserves.“)  Because  of  lagged-reserve 
accounting,  required  reserves  are  given  for  a  particu- 
lar  statement  week.  Given  a  projection  for  excess 
reserves,  the  weekly  target  for  nonborrowed  reserves 
then  determines,  via  (2))  a  weekly  target  for  bor- 
rowed  reserves.  Within  a  particular  week,  conse- 
quently,  the  desk  uses  nonborrowed  reserves  and 
borrowed  reserves  interchangeably  as  operating  tar- 
gets. 
The  Federal  Reserve  assesses  its  reserve  targets 
each  week.  First,  the  staff  of  the  Board  of  Governors 
makes  adjustments  to  the  nonborrowed-reserves  and 
total-reserves  targets  in  order  to  offset  shifts  in  the 
ratio  of  reserves  to  checkable  deposits.  Estimates  of 
this  ratio  change  because  of  changes  in  estimates  of 
excess  reserves  and  of  required  reserves  generated  by 
the  reservable  nonmonetary  liabilities  of  financial 
institutions.  These  adjustments  alter  the  desk’s  tar- 
get  for  total  reserves  and  nonborrowed  reserves  by 
equal  amounts.  Consequently,  neither  the  average 
target  nor  the  weekly  targets  for  borrowed  reserves 
are  affected.  In  conjunction  with  a  revised  projection 
of  money-supply  growth,  a  projection  is  made  of  the 
average  amount  of  total  reserves  that  will  be  out- 
standing  over  the  current  targeting  interval.  The 
desk  subtracts  its  target  for  average  nonborrowed 
reserves,  adjusted  as  just  described,  from  this  newly 
revised  estimate  of  average  total  reserves  in  order  to 
arrive  at  a  new  target  for  average  borrowed  reserves. 
The  desk  then  derives  a  new  weekly  borrowed- 
reserves  target. 
As  a  consequence  of  targeting  nonborrowed  re- 
serves,  deviations  of  the  money  supply  from  its  tar- 
geted  path  produce,  via  associated  movements  of  total 
reserves,  changes  in  borrowed  reserves.  Changes  in 
borrowed  reserves,  in  turn,  produce  changes  in  the 
5 The  Federal  Reserve  uses  the  language  “initial  assump- 
tion  for  borrowed  reserves.”  It  is  felt  that  the  word 
“assumption,”  rather  than  “target,”  conveys  more  of  the 
sense  of  the  practice  of  changing  this  variable  when 
misses  of  money-supply  targets  occur. 
funds  rate  that  mitigate  the  miss  from  the  money- 
supply  target.  The  Federal  Reserve  can  also  make 
discretionary  changes  in  its  operating  targets  in  re- 
sponse  to  misses  of  the  money-supply  target.  It  can, 
at  FOMC  meetings,  raise  or  lower  the  initial  target 
for  average  borrowed  reserves  relative  to  the  pre- 
vailing  level,  thereby  lowering  or  raising  the  initial 
target  for  average  nonborrowed  reserves.6*  r  The 
desk  can  change  the  target  for  average  nonborrowed 
reserves  between  FOMC  meetings.  Finally,  the 
discount  rate  can  be  changed.8  (See  [ 31  for  an  alter- 
native  description  of  these  operating  procedures.) 
V.  The  Behavior 
in  1980 
of  the  Money  Supply 
As  indicated  by  Figure  2,  the  rate  of  growth  of  the 
money  supply,  measured  by  MlB,  was  extremely 
variable  within  1980.  The  analytical  framework  of 
Section  II  is  used  in  order  to  explain  this  behavior.9 
MlB  grew  rapidly  from  the  end  of  1979  through 
s  In  setting  this  target.  the  FOMC  aonears  most  often  in 
1980  to  h&e  taken-the  target  for  a&age  borrowed  re- 
serves  that  was  in  force  going  into  a  particular  FOMC 
meeting  and  to  have  set  the  new  target  equal  to  this 
existing  target,  after  an  adjustment  for  recently  observed 
shifts  in  the  reserve  supply  schedule.  For  example,  if  the 
last  weekly  observation  available  indicated  that  realized 
borrowed  reserves  had  fallen  without  any  change  in  the 
funds  rate,  then  the  new  initial  target  for  borrowed  re- 
serves  would  have  been  set  somewhat  below  the  currently 
prevailing  target. 
7 In  the  face  of  a  miss  of  the  money-supply  target,  the 
FOMC  at  a  given  meeting  will  also  move  the  non- 
borrowed-reserves  target  in-the  appropriate  direction  by 
retaining  the  existing  intrayearly  target  for  the  money 
supply  and  by  adopting  the  target  for  borrowed  reserves 
that  existed  going  into  the  FOMC  meeting.  Consider  an 
overshoot  of  the  money  supply.  This  overshoot  will  have 
caused  the  target  for  average  borrowed  reserves  to  in- 
crease.  relative  to  the  initial  value  set  at  the  nrior  FOMC 
meeting.  Leaving  the  money-supply  target  path  un- 
changed  will  leave  the  target  for  total  reserves  essentially 
unchanged.  Subtracting-the  increased  target  for  bor- 
rowed  reserves  from  the  essentially  unchanged  target  for 
total  reserves  will  lower  the  target  for  average  nonbor- 
rowed  reserves,  relative  to  the  value  set  at  the  prior 
FOM  C  meeting. 
s  The  Federal  Reserve  could  use  alterations  in  the 
required-reserve  ratio  against  checkable  deposits  as  an 
operating  variable.  The  alterations  in  the  way  required 
reserves  are  computed  that  have  occurred  since  October 
1979  (apart  from  changes  mandated  by  the  Monetary 
Control  Act)  have  involved  the  nonmonetary  liabilities  of 
banks,  however,  and  have  been  designed  to  control, 
through  an  excise-tax  effect,  the  extension  of  credit,  not 
money.  The  nonborrowed-reserves  target  has  always 
been  adjusted  in  order  to  offset  the  changes  in  required 
reserves  arising  from  such  alterations  in  reserve  require- 
ments. 
9 The  primary  empirical  test  of  the  analytical  model  is 
whether  it  is  useful  in  understanding  the  actual  behavior 
of  the  money  supply.  Confidence  in  the  model  will  come 
only  after  extended  successful  application  of  it. 





Figure  2 
TARGETED  AND  ACTUAL  BEHAVIOR 
OF  MlB  OVER  1980 
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NOTE:  The  target  range  for  growth  of  MlB  from  fourth  quarter 
1979  to  fourth  quarter  1980,  specified  by  the  FOMC  in 
February  1980,  was  4  to  6%  percent.  The  base  and  final 
values  ore  plotted  in  November  of  1979  and  1980,  respec- 
tively.  The  cone  plots  interpolated  values.  The  realized 
values  for  MlB  were  taken  from  the  Federal  Reserve  statistical 
release  H.6,  dated  l/9/81.  logarithmic  values  ore  plotted. 
February  1980.  This  growth  derived  from  a  right- 
ward  shift  in  the  bank-credit  demand  schedule,  which 
in  turn  derived  from  an  optimistic  revision  by  the 
public  of  its  estimate  of  the  strength  of  the  economy. 
This  optimistic  revision  was  prompted  by  the  strength 
of  incoming  data  on  the  real  sector,  which  belied  the 
Figure  3a 
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prevalent  forecast  of  a  recession,  and  by  increased 
estimates  of  defense  spending  following  the  Soviet 
invasion  of  Afghanistan  in  December  1979.  (The 
rightward  shift  in  the  bank-credit  demand  schedule  is 
shown  in  Figure  3b  by  the  movement  of  BCD  to 
BCD’.) 
The  president’s  budget  message  in  late  January 
was  viewed  as  avoiding  hard  choices  between  defense 
and  domestic  spending  and,  consequently,  as  pre- 
saging  continued  large  budget  deficits.  This  pros- 
pect,  as  well  as  the  belief  that  recession  was  no  longer 
imminent,  caused  the  public  to  revise  upward  its 
near-term  and  long-term  expectations  of  the  inflation 
rate.  As  a  consequence,  the  bank-credit  demand 
schedule,  defined  as  a  function  of  the  nominal  rate  of 
interest,  shifted  upward  (rightward).  An  increase 
in  the  expected  rate  of  inflation,  however,  does  not 
affect  the  position  of  the  reserve-supply  schedule  and, 
thus,  does  not  in  itself  raise  the  cost  of  reserves  to 
banks. 
The  rightward  shifts  in  the  bank-credit  demand 
schedule  described  above  caused  bank  credit  and 
deposits  to  increase,  in  the  first  instance  at  an  un- 
changed  funds  rate.  With  a  two-week  lag,  the 
increase  in  deposits  caused  the  reserve-demand  sched- 
ule  to  shift  rightward.  Given  the  target  for  nonbor- 
rowed  reserves,  and  thus  a  fixed  reserve  supply 
schedule,  the  rightward  shift  in  the  reserve  demand 
schedule  caused  borrowed  reserves  and  the  funds  rate 
Figure  3b 
BANK  CREDIT  MARKET 
BCD  BCD’ 
\  \ 
BC,  BC’,  Bank  Credit 
NOTE:  Labels  ore  explained  in  Figure  1. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  9 to  rise.  The  rise  in  the  funds  rate  partially  offset,  but 
did  not  eliminate  the  overshoot  in  the  Federal  Re- 
serve’s  intrayearly  money-supply  targets.  (The  de- 
moralization  of  the  bond  market  in  February  also 
affected  the  behavior  of  the  money  supply,  but  discus- 
sion  of  this  phenomenon  is  reserved  for  later  in  this 
section.) 
The  Federal  Reserve  responded  to  this  overshoot 
by  moving  its  operating  targets  vigorously  in  late 
February  and  early  March.lO  The  target  for  average 
nonborrowed  reserves  was  lowered  twice.  (This 
lowering  is  shown  in  Figure  3a  by  the  leftward  shift 
of  NBRo  to  NBRo’  and  by  the  associated  shift  in  the 
reserve-supply  schedule  from  RS  to  RS’.)  The  dis- 
count  rate  was  raised  a  percentage  point  (shown  in 
Figure  3a  by  the  upward  shift  in  RS’  to  RS”).  The 
annualized  rate  of  growth  of  MlB  was  reduced  from 
7.7  percent  from  December  to  February  to  5.2  per- 
cent  from  December  to  March,  almost  exactly  the 
midpoint  of  the  Federal  Reserve’s  four-quarter  target 
range  for  growth  of  MlB.  (Figures  3a  and  3b  show 
the  final  level  of  bank  credit,  BCO’,  only  slightly  above 
its  original  level,  and  the  associated  reserve-demand 
schedule,  RD’.) 
From  March  through  May,  the  annualized  rate  of 
growth  of  MlB  fell  to  -7.4  percent.  This  monetary 
deceleration  was  produced  by  the  Special  Credit  Re- 
straint  Program  (SCRP),  announced  &larch  14.  The 
immediate  objective  of  the  SCRP  was  to  reduce  the 
10 The  documentation  of  this  section  necessarily  depends 
upon  the  publicly  available  sources  of  information  con- 
cerning  the  operating  targets  of  the  Federal  Reserve.  As 
background,  it  is  noted  that  before  October  1979,  the 
operating  target  of  the  Federal  Reserve  was  the  Federal 
funds  rate.  With  a  lag  of  about  a  month,  the  public  was 
informed,  in  the  Record  of  Policy  Actions,  of  the  initial 
value  specified  by  the  FOMC  for  this  operating  target,  of 
subsequent  changes  in  the  targeted  value,  and  of  the 
reasons  these  changes  occurred.  In  October  1979,  non- 
borrowed  reserves  replaced  the  funds  rate  as  the  Federal 
Reserve’s  operating  jarget.  At  this  time,  the  Record  of 
Policy  Actions  ceased  reporting  any  information  about 
the  operating  target.  It  also  ceased  to  be  a  complete 
summary  of  FOMC  policy  actions  due  to  omission  of 
any  mention  of  the  FOMC’s  initial  target  for  average 
borrowed  reserves  . 
The  only  publicly  available  source  of  this  information  is 
the  annual  report  of  open  market  operations  published  in 
the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  Ouarterly  Re- 
view  (generally)  in  August  of  the  succeeding  year.  This 
report,  however,  is  intended  for  a  general  audience,  not 
just  students  of  the  money-supply  process.  It  does  not 
necessarily  provide  for  a  sharp  distinction,  critical  for  the 
purpose-  of  this  article,  between  those  changes  in  the 
targets  for  nonborrowed  reserves  that  should  be  con- 
sidered  as  “technical”  and  those  that  should  be  considered 
as  significantly  influencing  the  behavior  of  the  money 
supply.  The  documentation  then  for  this  section  rests 
on  the  material  in  [9],  but  the  author  has  exercised  some 
judgment  as  to  which  of  the  changes  in  the  targets  for 
nonborrowed  reserves  listed  there  were  significant  for 
purposes  of  monetary  control. 
rate  of  growth  of  credit  in  general  and  bank-credit  in 
particular,  as  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  prior  to  the 
announcement  of  the  program  growth  of  the  money 
supply  (M  1B)  was  approximately  on  target.  Because 
the  nominal  quantities  of  bank  credit  and  checkable 
deposits  are  functionally  related,  they  cannot  be  tar- 
geted  independently.  Ordinarily,  the  Federal  Reserve 
accepts  the  consequences  of  its  money-supply  targets 
for  the  rate  of  growth  of  nominal  bank  credit;  how- 
ever,  this  situation  was  reversed  to  a  significant  ex- 
tent  after  March  14.  The  SCRP  acted  in  several 
specific  ways  to  produce  a  monetary  deceleration. 
One  feature  of  the  SCRP  was  a  surcharge  of  three 
percentage  points  over  the  discount  rate  applied  to 
“frequent”  use  of  the  discount  window  by  banks 
with  deposits  in  excess  of  $500  million.  (The  sur- 
charge  itself,  because  of  its  application  to  only  a 
subset  of  member  banks,  complicated  monetary  con- 
trol  by  rendering  the  behavior  of  the  reserve-supply 
schedule  even  less  predictable.)  A  scatter  diagram 
of  borrowed  reserves  against  the  differential  between 
the  funds  rate  and  the  discount  rate  (a  graphical  esti- 
mate  of  the  upward-sloping  section  of  the  reserve- 
supply  schedule)  indicates  that,  after  the  surcharge, 
the  interest  rate  differential  associated  with  a  given 
amount  of  borrowed  reserves  increased  by  about  three 
percentage  points.  It  is  uncertain,  however,  how 
much  of  the  increase  in  the  differential  was  due  to  the 
direct  effect  of  the  surcharge.  The  increase  could 
have  been  caused  by  an  upward  rotation  of  the 
upward-sloping  section  of  the  reserve-supply  schedule 
due  to  the  effect  of  tough  Federal  Reserve  rhetoric 
on  banks’  perception  of  the  nonpecuniary  costs  asso- 
ciated  with  use  of  the  discount  window.  In  any  event, 
the  sharp  increase  in  the  funds  rate  produced  by  the 
surcharge  reduced  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  money 
supply. 
The  SCRP  also  compelled  banks  to  hold  loan 
growth  to  within  6  to  9  percent.  Because  of  strong 
loan  growth  in  January  and  February,  and  because 
of  the  possibility  that  corporations  would  make  use 
of  outstanding  lines  of  credit,  banks  were  fearful  of 
exceeding  the  guidelines.  This  fear  had  the  effect  of 
causing  banks  to  increase  the  differential  between  the 
rate  on  bank  loans  and  the  funds  rate  and  money 
market  rates.  A  result  was  to  shift  intermediation  to 
the  money  market  from  banks.  The  consequent  re- 
duction  in  bank  credit  depressed  bank  deposits  and 
the  money  supply.  Also,  the  psychological  effect  of 
the  SCRP  caused  the  public  to  reduce  its  use  of 
credit.  Installment  credit  contracted  at  a  seasonally 
adjusted  annual  rate  of  7.5  percent  in  April  and  13 
percent  in  both  May  and  June,  causing  the  bank- 
10  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  JULY/AUGUST  1982 credit  demand  schedule  to  shift  leftward.  Finally,  as 
the  public  became  convinced  that  a  significant  reces- 
sion  was  underway,  it  lowered  its  inflationary  antici- 
pations  and  the  bank-credit  demand  schedule  shifted 
downward  (leftward).  These  shifts  in  the  bank- 
credit  demand  schedule  depressed  the  money  supply. 
The  Federal  Reserve  apparently  did  not  realize 
initiaIly  that  its  targets  for  bank  credit  and  the  money 
supply  would  conflict.  At  its  March  and  April  meet- 
ings,  the  FOMC  extended  the  target  for  MIB  in  line 
with  the  targets  of  previou:  meetings.  (Only  starting 
with  the  May  meeting  did  the  FOMC  begin  to  lower 
its  MIB  targets.)ll  The  resulting  targets  for  non- 
borrowed  reserves,  in  combination  with  the  reduced 
demand  for  total  reserves  associated  with  the  drop  in 
the  money  supply,  produced  a sharp  drop  in  borrowed 
reserves  and  in  the  funds  rate.  The  weekly  average 
value  of  the  funds  rate  dropped  about  ten  percentage 
points  from  early  April  to  late  May. 
From  May  through  August,  MlB  grew  at  an  an- 
nualized  rate  of  16.9  percent.  A  distinguishing  char- 
acteristic  of  this  period  is  that  for  the  statement  weeks 
11 At  its  March  and  April  meetings,  the  FOMC  set  an 
intrayearly  target  for  growth  of  MlB  designed  to  place 
MlB  at  the  midpoint  of  its  four-quarter  target  cone, 
shown  in  Figure  2,  by  June.  At  the  May  meeting,  it  set 
an  intrayearly  target  for  MlB  designed  tb  achieve  the 
midpoint  of  its  target  cone  only  by  year-end.  At  the 
subsequent  meeting  in  July,  it  set  an  intrayearly  target 
for  MIB  designed  to  place  MIB  at  the  bottom  of  its 
target  cone  by  year-end.  (See  the  Record  of  Policy 
Actions  of  the  Federal  Open  Market  Committee  in  [l] 
for  March,  p.  110,  for  April,  p.  118,  for  May,  p.  123,  and 
for  July,  pp.  130  and  131.) 
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ending  May  7 through  August  20,  the  weekly  average 
value  of  the  funds  rate  was  below  the  discount  rate. 
At  least  through  early  August,  the  funds  rate  implied 
by  the  FOMC’s  money-supply  target  was  also  below 
the  discount  rate.  In  order  to  understand  the  Federal 
Reserve’s  operating  procedures  over  this  interval,  it 
is  necessary  to  alter  in  two  ways  the  reserve-supply 
schedule  shown  in  the  diagram  representing  the  re- 
serves  market.  First,  the  reserve-supply  schedule  is 
horizontal  at  the  lower  and  upper  limits  of  the 
FOMC’s  tolerance  range  for  variation  in  the  funds 
rate.12 
For  banks  either  borrowing  late  in  the  day  or 
already  borrowing  significant  imounts  of  fed  funds, 
the  cost  of  borrowing  funds  can  exceed  the  value  of 
the  funds  rate  at  which  most  trades  are  occurring. 
For  these  banks,  this  differential  can  be  large  enough 
that  it  is  advantageous  to  use  the  discount  window 
even  when  the  generally  prevailing  funds  rate  lies 
below  the  discount  rate.  This  borrowing  increases 
the  supply  of  reserves  beyond  nonborrowed  reserves 
even  when  the  funds  rate  lies  below  the  discount  rate. 
The  phenomenon  is  shown  in  Figure  4a  by  the  posi- 
tive,  but  highly  inelastic,  slope  of  the  reserve-supply 
schedule  immediately  to  the  right  of  the  existing 
value  of  nonborrowed  reserves,  NBRo.  Above  the 
discount  rate,  DRo,  the  reserve-supply  schedule  ex- 
hibits  the  relatively  more  elastic  slope  shown  in  the 
previous  diagrams. 
l2  The  Federal  Reserve  describes  the  limits  as  “points 
for  Committee  consultation.” 
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FR,,  and  FRul  we  the  lower  and  upper  limits  for  the  funds  rate  set  by  the  FOMC.  Other  labels  we  explained  in  Figure  1. 
FEBERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  11 For  the  period  from  May  7  through  August  20,  the 
Federal  Reserve  lost  the  ability  to  use  nonborrowed 
reserves  as  an  operating  target.  Over  this  interval, 
the  reserve  demand  schedule  intersected  the  reserve- 
supply  schedule  along  the  latter  schedule’s  inelastic 
section,  so  that  the  funds  rate  lay  below  the  discount 
rate  (see  Figure  4a).  In  this  situation,  an  increase 
in  nonborrowed  reserves,  a  rightward  shift  of  the 
reserve-supply  schedule,  would  have  forced  the  funds 
rate  down  to  the  lower  limit  of  its  tolerance  range, 
thereby  making  the  funds  rate  the  desk’s  operating 
target.  A  decrease  in  nonborrowed  reserves,  a  left- 
ward  shift  of  the  reserve-supply  schedule,  would  have 
forced  the  funds  rate  up  to  the  discount  rate,  a  value 
in  excess  of  what  was  implied  by  the  money-supply 
target.ls 
At  the  May  and  July  FOMC  meetings  (there  was 
no  June  meeting),  the  FOMC  set  minimum  targets 
for  growth  of  the  money  supply.  Growth  moderately 
above  target  was  to  be  accommodated  by  the  desk. 
In  fact,  the  money  supply  did  grow  somewhat  faster 
than  the  minimum  targeted  values.  The  desk  caused 
the  reserve-supply  schedule  to  shift  in  line  with  the 
rightward  shifts  in  the  reserve-demand  schedule  by 
targeting  a  very  small  level  of  borrowed  reserves. 
(Toward  the  end  of  July,  the  desk  stopped  raising  its 
target  for  nonborrowed  reserves,  but  its  projections 
of  the  money  supply  and  total  reserves  apparently 
caused  it  to  continue  to  target  only  a  small  amount 
of  borrowed  reserves.)  As  shown  in  Figure  2,  from 
May  through  August,  MlB  moved  from  well  below 
to  the  upper  part  of  its  target  cone.  This  desired 
result,  however,  was  not  accomplished  by  active  ma- 
nipulation  of  nonborrowed  reserves,  but  rather  by  the 
vagaries  of  shifts  in  the  bank-credit  demand  schedule. 
From  August  to  November,  MIB  grew  at  an  an- 
nualized  rate  of  12.9  percent.  Money-supply  growth 
exceeded  its  targeted  values  from  late  summer 
through  the  December  19  FOMC  meeting.  As  a 
consequence,  MlB  grew  at  a  rate  of  7.3  percent 
13  In  order  to  have  retained  nonborrowed  reserves  as  the 
operating  target,  the  Federal  Reserve  would  have  had  to 
lower  both  the  discount  rate  and  its  target  for  nonbor- 
rowed  reserves  (shift  the  RS  schedule  downward  and 
leftward).  In  this  way,  the  relatively  elastic  section  of 
the  reserve-supply  schedule  would  again  have  intersected 
the  reserve-demand  schedule,  so  that  either  changes  in 
the  nonborrowed-reserves  target  or  in  the  reserve  demand 
schedule  would  not  have  forced  the  funds  rate  to  the  limit 
of  its  tolerance  range.  The  Record  of  Policy  Actions  for 
the  May  FOMC  meeting  records  a  concern  that  further 
declines  in  short-term  rates  would  exacerbate  inflationary 
expectations  and  weaken  the  foreign-exchange  value  of 
the  dollar  [I,  p.  1231.  This  concern  can  be  inferred  to 
have  limited  willingness  of  the  Federal  Reserve  to  lower 
the  discount  rate  and  thus  to  have  accounted  for  the 
summer’s  operating  procedures. 
between  the  fourth  quarters  of  1979  and  1980,  some- 
what  in  excess  of  the  top  of  its  targeted  range. 
Beginning  in  the  summer,  the  economy  rebounded 
strongly  from  the  depressing  effects  of  the  SCRP. 
The  public  reduced  its  estimate  of  the  length  and  the 
severity  of  the  current  recession  and  increased  its 
estimate  of  the  future  rate  of  inflation.  As  a  result  of 
these  events,  the  bank-credit  demand  schedule  shifted 
rightward  and  bank  deposits  increased.  The  Federal 
Reserve,  by  holding  to  its  nonborrowed-reserves  tar- 
gets  in  the  face  of  a  rightward  shifting  reserve- 
demand  schedule,  caused  borrowed  reserves  and  the 
funds  rate  to  increase,  thereby  moderating,  but  not 
eliminating,  the  overshoot  of  the  money  sup~1y.l~ 
The  Federal  Reserve  made  discretionary  changes 
in  its  operating  targets  only  belatedly.  In  particular, 
it  did  not,  to  any  meaningful  extent,  lower  its  targets 
for  nonborrowed  reserves.15  As  an  alternative  to 
reductions  by  the  desk  in  the  target  for  nonborrowed 
reserves,  the  FOMC  could  have  increased  the  initial 
targets  for  average  borrowed  reserves,  relative  to  the 
14  Initially,  however,  this  mechanism  was  a  weak  reed. 
“The  rise  in  borrowings  from  frictional  levels  to  over 
$1  billion  between  mid-August  and  mid-September  may 
have  been  rapid  by  past  standards,  but  the  resulting 
increase  in  the  federal  funds  rate  of  about  s/8  percentage 
point  appeared  small  to  the  market  in  relation  to  the 
overshoots  reported  weekly  in  the  money  supply”  [S,  p. 
341. 
15In  the  period  from  September  through  December,  the 
desk  reduced  the  target  for  average  nonborrowed  reserves 
in  four  targeting  intervals  for  reasons  unrelated  to  a 
revision  in  the  estimated  relationship  between  reserves 
and  checkable  deposits.  Such  reductions  in  the  target 
for  average  nonborrowed  reserves  do  not  necessarily 
increase  the  funds  rate,  however.  First,  they  do  not  if 
they  are  caused  by  the  problem  that  can  arise  from 
expressing  reserves  targets  as  averages.  In  particular, 
an  overshoot  in  borrowing  in  the  first  part  of  a  targeting 
interval  can  cause  the  desk  to  lower  its  weekly  target  for 
nonborrowed  reserves  in  order  to  prevent  the  appearance 
of  excess  reserves  large  enough  to  force  a  sharp  drop  in 
the  funds  rate.  Achievement  of  the  target  for  average 
nonborrowed  reserves  over  the  remainder  of  the  targeting 
interval  can  then  require  weekly  targets  for  nonborrowed 
reserves  that  imply  little  or  no  borrowing.  In  such  cases, 
the  desk  may  reduce  the  target  for  average  nonborrowed 
reserves  in  order  to  keep  the  weekly  targets  for  borrowed 
reserves  from  declining  significantly.  (See  [9],  p.  65  and 
the  discussion  surrounding  the  September  reduction  in 
the  target  for  nonborrowed  reserves,  p.  73.)  Second,  a 
reduction  in  the  target  for  average  nonborrowed  reserves 
will  not  increase  the  funds  rate  if  a  reduction  in  the 
target  for  average  nonborrowed  reserves  called  for  by  a 
concurrent  downward  revision  in  the  estimated  reserves- 
deposits  ratio  is  not  also  effected.  In  such  a  case,  the 
rise  in  the  target  for  average  borrowed  reserves  and  in 
the  funds  rate  is  nullified.  Finally,  the  effect  of  a  reduc- 
tion  in  the  target  for  average  nonborrowed  reserves  can 
be  offset  if,  at  the  subsequent  FOMC  meeting,  the  initial 
target  for  average  borrowed  reserves  is  lowered  signifi- 
cantly  relative  to  the  target  prevailing  at  the  time  of  the 
meeting.  Reductions  in  the  target  for  average  nonbor- 
rowed  reserves  acted  unambiguously  to  decrease  growth 
of  the  money  supply  only  after  the  November  18  FOMC 
meeting. 
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not.  Alternatively,  as  explained  in  note  6,  the  FOMC, 
at  its  meetings,  could  have  adopted  the  prevailing 
target  for  borrowed  reserves,  while  leaving  un- 
changed  its  money-supply  target.  In  fact,  over  most 
of  the  last  half  of  1980,  the  FOMC  raised  its  money- 
supply  target  in  response  to  overshoots.16  The  dis- 
cretionary  changes  in  operating  targets  that  did  occur 
after  July  were  essentially  confined  to  three  one 
percentage-point  increases  in  the  discount  rate  (on 
September  26,  November  17,  and  December  5).  In 
the  second  instance,  a  surcharge  of  two  percentage 
points  was  imposed  on  “frequent”  borrowing  by  large 
banks.  In  the  third  instance,  the  surcharge  was  in- 
creased  to  three  percentage  points. 
The  uncertainty  surrounding  the  inflation  forecasts 
of  market  participants  increased  in  the  summer  for 
two  reasons.  The  midyear  review  of  the,  federal 
budget  and  renewed  talk  of  large  tax  cuts  caused 
deficits  of  significant,  but  unpredictable,  size  to  ap- 
pear  likely  in  the  future.  Also,  the  unanticipated 
pickup  of  economic  activity  rendered  forecasts  of  the 
business  cycle  unusually  difficult.  Starting  in  Sep- 
tember,  borrowers  and  lenders  became,  to  a  signifi- 
cant  extent,  unwilling  to  commit  themselves  to  long- 
term,  fixed-income  securities.  Borrowers  who  would 
have  used  the  bond  market  turned  to  commercial 
banks,  causing  the  blink-credit  demand  schedule  to 
shift  rightward. 
If  the  lenders  who  left  the  bond  market  had  ac- 
quired  the  nonmonetary  liabilities  of  banks  exclu- 
sively  (for  example  CD’s),  this  rightward  shift  in 
the  bank-credit  demand  schedule  would  have  been 
matched  by  a  rightward  shift  in  the  demand  schedule 
for  the  nonmonetary  liabilities  of  banks.  Total  and 
nonmonetary  deposits  would  have  increased  by  the 
same  amount  with  no  effect  on  checkable  deposits 
(see  n.  3).  Former  lenders  in  the  bond  market, 
however,  must  have  placed  at  least  some  of  their 
funds,  perhaps  temporarily,  in  checkable  deposits. 
16 At  the  July  FOMC  meeting,  the  targeted  four-quarter 
rate  of  growth  of  MlB  was  set  close  to  the  lower  bound 
of  the  four-quarter  target  range,  4  to  6%  percent.  “The 
FOMC  is in fact  prepared  to consider  that  MlB  measures 
may  fall  significantly  short  of  the  midpoint  of  their 
specified  ranges  for  the  year”  [ll,  p.  638-j.  At  the 
September  and  October  meetings,  the  targeted  four- 
quarter  rate  of growth  of  MlB  was,  respectively,  set  close 
to  and  somewhat  above  the  upper  bound  of  the  four- 
quarter  target  range.  (A  rev&ion  of  the  estimate  of 
growth  of  NOW  and  ATS  accounts  that  was  coming  at 
the  expense  of  savings  deposits  accounted  for  haTf  a 
percentage  point  of  this  rise  [l,  pp.  143,  1491.)  At  the 
November  meeting,  the  targeted  four-quarter  rate  of 
growth  of  MlB  was  left  unchanged,  but  the  initial  target 
for  average  borrowed  reserves  was  lowered  relative-to 
its  prevailing  value  at  the  time  of  the  meeting. 
Others  must  have  purchased  money  market  instru- 
ments  such  as  Treasury  bills,  thereby  increasing  at 
least  temporarily  the  checkable  deposits  of  the  sellers 
of  these  instruments.  The  result  was  that  the  right- 
ward  shift  in  the  bank-credit  demand  schedule  was 
only  partly  matched  by  a  rightward  shift  in.  the 
public’s  demand  schedule  for  the  nonmonetary  lia- 
bilities  of  banks,  and  therefore  checkable  deposits 
increased. 
The  Federal  Reserve  delayed  making  discretionary 
changes  in  its  operating  targets  in  response  to  the 
resurgent  growth  of  the  money  supply.  It  is  conjec- 
tured  here  that  this  delayed  response  imparted  a  self- 
reinforcing  character  to  money-supply  growth  in  the 
last  part  of  1980.  As  argued  above,  the  reduction  of 
intermediation  via  the  bond  market  increased  the  rate 
of  growth  of  the  money  supply,  This  monetary  ac- 
celeration  increased  the  public’s  uncertainty  sur- 
rounding  the  future  inflation  rate.  This  increased 
uncertainty,  in  turn,  further  reduced  activity  in  the 
bond  market  and,  consequently,  reinforced  one  of  the 
impulses  toward  an  increased  rate  of  growth  of  the 
money  s~pp1y.l~ 
VI.  Summary  and  Conclusions 
Several  reasons  were  advanced  in  Section  V  for 
the  variability  of  money  within  1980.  One  was  that 
in  the  spring  the  Federal  Reserve  employed  bank 
credit  as  an  intermediate  target.  In  the  fall  in  par- 
ticular,  the  Federal  Reserve  responded  to  misses  in 
its  money-supply  targets  by  relying  primarily  on  the 
semiautomatic  corrective  forces  set  in  motion  through 
maintenance  of  a  given  target  path  for  nonborrowed 
reserves.  It  can  be  inferred  that  a necessary  condition 
for  the  Federal  Reserve  to  achieve  its  intrayearly 
money-supply  targets  is  frequent  alteration  of  its 
operating  target,  nonborrowed  reserves.  It  was  con- 
tended  in  Section  III  that  tl%E  combination  of  reserve- 
aggregate  targeting  and  lagged-reserve  accounting 
has  produced  a  regime  of  monetary  control  based  on 
unpredictable  behavioral  relationships.  This  situation 
creates  the  possibility  that  monetary  control  would  be 
enhanced  by  a  regime  based  upon  contemporaneous- 
reserve  accounting  and  a  total-reserves  operating 
target. 
17 It  is  frequently  argued  that  short-run  control  of  the 
money  supply  will  increase  interest-rate  variability.  In 
the  situation  just  discussed,  however,  if  the  Federal 
Reserve  had  achieved  its  short-run  money-supply  targets, 
it  might  have  limited  the  demoralization  of  the  bond 
market  caused  by  heightened  uncertainty  over  future 
inflation.  Short-term  interest  rates  would  not  have  had 
then  to  rise  as  high  as  they  did  ultimately  in  order  to 
control  the  money  supply. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  13 APPENDIX 
Consider  first  a  New  View  world.  The  monetary 
authority  is  assumed  to  increase  nonborrowed  re- 
serves  in  order  to  lower  the  funds  rate  by  an  amount 
that  produces  a  reduction  in  the  loan  rate  from  LRo 
to  LR,,’  and  a  reduction  in  the  rate  on  money  market 
instruments  from  Ro  to  RO’  (see  Figure  5).  The 
reduction  in  the  loan  rate  causes  bank  credit  to  in- 
crease  from  BCo  to  BCo’.  As  a  consequence  of  the 
balance  sheet  constraint  relating  bank  credit  and  de- 
posits,  deposits  increase  from  Do  to  Do’.  Under  the 
assumption  that  the  magnitude  of  the  slope  of  the 
demand  schedule  in  the  credit  market  exceeds  that  of 
the  demand  schedule  in  the  deposits  market,  deposits 
of  Do’ and  a  rate  on  money  market  instruments  of  Ro’ 
produce  excess  supply  in  the  deposits  market  of  ESo. 
This  excess  supply  causes  the  nonbank  public  to  pur- 
chase  bonds.  These  purchases,  in  turn,  cause  the 
bank-credit  demand  schedule  to  shift  leftward.  (This 
shift  is  shown  in  Figure  5a  by  the  dashed  line.)  At 
the  loan  rate  LR;,  bank  credit  falls  to  BCG‘  and 
deposits  fall  to  DO,  the  latter  quantity  lying  on  the 
unchanged  deposits  demand  schedule  of  the  nonbank 
public. 
The  primary  constraint  facing  the  monetary  au- 
thority  when  it  alters  the  nominal  quantity  of  deposits 
Figure  5a 
BANK  CREDIT  MARKET 
LOAN  RATE 
by  a given  amount  is  the  deposits  demand  schedule  of 
the  nonbank  public.  The  bank-credit  demand  sched- 
ule  will  shift  in  order  to  cause  the  associated  change 
in  bank  credit  to  produce  the  same  change  in  the 
interest  rate  in  the  bank  credit  market  as  was 
produced  in  the  market  for  the  quantity  of  money. 
Empirically,  the  New  View  requires  that  liquidity 
preference  be  the  primary  determinant  of  interest 
rates  over  short  intervals  of  time.  Heuristically,  the 
New  View  makes  alterations  in  the  money  supply  by 
the  monetary  authority  into  exercises  in  persuading 
the  nonbank  public  to  rearrange  its  asset  portfolio. 
The  Old  View  starts  from  the  perspective  of  money 
not  as  an  asset,  but  rather  as  a  medium  of  exchange, 
that  is,  as  a  buffer  to  asynchronous  receipts  and  ex- 
penditures.  As  a  consequence  of  this  role,  the  quan- 
tity  of  money  individuals  hold  changes  continually 
without  any  economically  significant  change  in  their 
demand  for  money.  The  monetary  authority,  in 
effect,  exploits  this  phenomenon  in  altering  the 
public’s  money  balances  without  at  the  same  time 
altering  its  demand  for  money  balances,  that  is,  with- 
out  having  to  move  the  nonbank  public  along  its 
money  demand  schedule.  With  reference  to  the  above 
example,  the  behavior  of  bank  credit  determines  a 
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R  is  the  interest  rate  on  money-market  instruments;  D  checkable  deposits;  DD  the  deposit  demand  schedule  of  the  nonbank  public. 
Other  labels  ore  explained  in  Figure  1. 
14  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  JULY/AUGUST  1982 nominal  quantity  of  deposits  (the  endpoint  of  the 
horizontal  line  drawn  at  R<  in  Figure  5b)  that  is 
given  to  the  market  for  the  quantity  of  money.  Indi- 
viduals  are  concerned  about  their  average  holdings  of 
money  balances.  Because  of  the  normal  variability  in 
their  money  holdings,  some  time  may  have  to  elapse 
before  they  realize  that  their  actual  average  holdings 
of  money  exceed  their  desired  average  holdings. 
When  this  realization  occurs,  aggregate  spending  will 
increase  as  individuals  try  to  run  down  their  cash 
balances. 
Economic  activity  will  be  stimulated,  and  in  time 
the  price  level  will  rise.  While  the  nominal  money 
balances  of  the  public  are  determined  in  the  market 
for  bank  credit,  its  real  money  balances  are  deter- 
mined  in  the  market  for  the  quantity  of  money.  The 
initial  increase  in  real  economic  activity  will  cause 
the  bank-credit  demand  schedule  to  shift  rightward, 
and  if  the  public  comes  to  anticipate  a  higher  rate  of 
inflation,  the  bank-credit  demand  schedule  will  shift 
upward.  Empirically,  it  is  these  latter  shifts  that  the 
Old  View  emphasizes,  rather  than  the  leftward  shift 
due  to  a  liquidity  preference  effect  that  is  emphasized 
by  the  New  View.  (The  New  and  Old  View  both 
are  in  accord  that  the  nonmonetary  liabilities  of  banks 
are  demand  determined.  See  note  3.) 
Finally,  the  bank-credit  demand  schedule  could 
shift  frequently  as  a  consequence  of  shifts  in  the 
deposits  demand  schedule.  In  this  case,  even  if  as  an 
empirical  matter  liquidity  preference  as  a  determinant 
of  interest  rates  is  weak,  the  New  View  is  relevant 
and  the  deposits  demand  schedule  replaces  the  bank- 
credit  demand  schedule  as  the  primary  behavioral 
constraint  facing  the  monetary  authority.  The  Old 
View  assumes  that  to  a  significant  extent  the  shocks 
that  impinge  on  the  market  for  bank  credit  are  real, 
rather  than  monetary,  in  origin. 
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